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Over the coming decades, the increasingly popular “precautionary principle” is likely
to have a significant impact on policies all over the world. Applying this principle could
lead to dramatic changes in decision making. Possible applications include climate change,
genetically modified food, nuclear power, homeland security, new drug therapies, and even
war.
We argue that the precautionary principle does not help individuals or nations make
difficult choices in a non-arbitrary way. Taken seriously, it can be paralyzing, providing
no direction at all. In contrast, balancing costs against benefits can offer the foundation
of a principled approach for making difficult decisions.
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Introduction
Over the coming decades, the increasingly popular “precautionary 
principle” is likely to have a significant impact on policies all over the world.  
The simplest interpretation of the precautionary principle is that “it is 
better to be safe than sorry.”  But the principle comes in many diverse forms, 
ranging from weak to strong.  One scholar counted nineteen. 
An example of a strong form is the influential Wingspread Declaration, 
produced in a meeting of environmentalists in 1998: “When an activity raises 
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures 
should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully 
established scientifically.”1
The European Union has taken a leadership role in promoting the 
precautionary principle as a basis for making decisions on environmental policy 
and other areas, such as trade. The EU has not specified the version of the 
principle that it would like to use in particular settings. But it has clearly endorsed 
the general idea that regulatory action should be taken even when harm cannot be 
established, and indeed even when it is highly speculative. 
Applying this principle, in any of its forms, could lead to dramatic changes 
in decision making. Possible areas in which it might be applied include climate 
change, genetically modified food, nuclear power, pesticides, cell phones, 
homeland security, new drug therapies, and even war. 
For this reason, serious thought needs to be given to the strengths and 
weakness of adopting this principle before using it to help make difficult 
decisions.
Why It’s Not Always Better to Be Safe than Sorry
Even the simplest interpretation of the precautionary principle—that “it is 
better to be safe than sorry”—raises complex questions.
To begin, an essential dilemma for policy makers is that it is not clear 
what to do if one wants to be “safe.” How safe is safe enough? Without 
1 Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle, available at http://www.gdrc.org/u-
gov/precaution-3.html. 
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considering the costs of providing safety, it is virtually impossible to answer this 
question.
For those who favor taking regulatory precautions, the conceptual 
difficulty is even worse.  Risks, sometimes unforeseen, can arise from action as 
well as from inaction; consider the war in Iraq.  And reducing risks in one policy 
domain (say, the environment) could increase risks in another (say, defense)—
especially when resources are scarce. 
A key problem with strong versions of the precautionary principle is that 
they are logically inconsistent.  They would frequently eliminate all policies from 
consideration—including the status quo —because almost all policies impose risks 
of one kind or another. 
A Few Examples of How All Policies—Even Precautionary Ones—Impose 
Risks 
To understand the difficulty, consider some examples.
Genetic modification of food has become a widespread practice.  The risks 
of that practice are not known with any precision.  Some people fear that genetic 
modification will result in serious ecological harm and large risks to human 
health; but others believe that genetic modification will result in more nutritious 
food and significant improvements in human health.
Many people fear nuclear power, on the grounds that nuclear power plants 
create various health and safety risks, including some possibility of catastrophe.  
But if a nation does not rely on nuclear power, it might well rely instead on fossil 
fuels, and in particular on coal-fired power plants. And such plants create risks of 
their own, including risks associated with global warming. At the same time, 
nuclear energy may actually decrease environmental risks: China, for example, 
has relied on nuclear energy, in a way that reduces greenhouse gases and a range 
of air pollution problems. 
In the early years of the Bush Administration, one of the most 
controversial environmental issues involved the regulation of arsenic in drinking 
water. There is a serious dispute over the precise level of risks posed by low 
levels of arsenic in water, but taking the worst-case scenario, over one hundred 
lives might be lost each year as a result of the original, 50-part-per-billion 
standard that the Clinton Administration sought to revise. At the same time, 
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however, the proposed ten-part-per-billion standard could cost over $200 million 
each year, and it is possible that it would save as few as six lives annually.
In these cases, what kind of guidance is provided by the precautionary 
principle? It is tempting to say that the principle calls for strong controls on 
genetic engineering of food, on nuclear power, and on arsenic.  After all, in each 
of these cases, there is a possibility of serious harms. Genetically modified foods, 
for example, seem like a core area in which to apply the Wingspread Declaration, 
as there are threats of harm (not fully proven) to human health and the 
environment.  
But so applied, is the precautionary principle really helpful?  The answer, 
in each of these cases, is that it is not. One reason is that regulation might well 
deprive society of significant benefits, and hence produce serious harms that 
would otherwise not occur. 
In some cases, regulation eliminates the benefits of a process or activity, 
and thus causes preventable deaths.  If this is so, then regulation is hardly 
precautionary; indeed, it violates the precautionary principle. 
The problem is not limited to these examples. It is quite general.
Consider, for example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 
precautionary decision to ban almost all uses of asbestos.  That decision was 
invalidated in federal court, in part, on the ground that in some contexts, the 
alternatives appear to create larger risks than asbestos itself does. 
In the court’s words, “the EPA cannot say with any assurance that its 
regulation will increase workplace safety when it refuses to evaluate the harm that 
will result from the increased use of substitute products”—especially since “many 
of the substitutes that EPA itself concedes will be used in place of asbestos have 
known carcinogenic effects.”2
2
 Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
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The Necessity of Considering All Relevant Risks—Not Just Those Lessened 
by Regulation
These examples suggest that regulation sometimes violates the 
precautionary principle because it gives rise to other risks, in the form of hazards 
that materialize, or are increased, as a result of regulation. 
Consider the drug approval process. If a government takes a highly 
precautionary approach to the introduction of new medicines and drugs onto the 
market, it will protect people against harms from inadequately tested drugs; but it 
will also prevent people from receiving potential benefits from those very drugs. 
Of course, the proper approach to new drugs is much disputed.  But the 
precautionary principle cannot help to answer a key question within this inquiry:  
What is the appropriate level of pre-market testing?  
If the strong version of the precautionary principle is taken seriously, 
extensive regulatory requirements are both required and forbidden.  Would it not 
be better to ask whether any particular approval process creates benefits, through 
preventing iatrogenic illness, that exceed the costs of unavailable medications and 
foregone innovation?
Regulation Typically Creates New Risk Profiles, Rather than Simply 
Lessening Risk
It turns out that the danger that regulation will create new or different risk 
profiles is the rule, not the exception. 
In the case of arsenic, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency expressed concern that aggressive regulation, by virtue of its cost, will 
lead people to cease using local water systems and to rely on private wells, which 
have high levels of contamination.  If this is so, then stringent arsenic regulation 
violates the precautionary principle, for the same reason that less stringent 
regulation does. 
 The issue is compounded by the fact that regulations and policy 
interventions use scarce resources. A great deal of empirical work suggests that an 
expensive regulation can have adverse effects on life and health.  It has been 
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argued, for example, that a statistical life can be lost for an expenditure of 
between $7 to $15 million.3
We do not mean to accept any particular amount here, or even to suggest 
that there has been an unambiguous demonstration of an association between 
mortality and regulatory expenditures.  Rather, for purposes of evaluating the 
precautionary principle, with its attempt to prevent even speculative harm, our 
only point here is that reasonable people do believe in that association. 
This tradeoff between wealth and health makes the precautionary principle 
hard to implement not merely where regulation removes benefits, or introduces or 
increases other risks, but in any case in which the regulation costs a significant 
amount. 
 For this reason, the precautionary principle raises doubts about many 
expensive regulations. The most general point is that, the precautionary principle 
is frequently paralyzing: It can stand as an obstacle to regulation and 
nonregulation, and to everything in between. 
Privileging Existing Risks over New Risks Makes Little, If Any, Sense
Advocates of the principle might be able to find ways out of this dilemma. 
For example, they could say that new risks are unacceptable, but existing risks are 
fine.  And, indeed, a bias in favor of existing risks does seem to animate many 
uses of the precautionary principle. 
But that bias is hard to defend in principle.  By its logic, we would never 
have accepted electricity, the automobile, the Internet, or countless other 
inventions that allow our modern society to function—but that impose risks.  
(Alternatively, one could embrace all new risks and scoff at existing risks—but 
that would lead to an equally troubling result, leading us to accept even very 
highly risky innovations with little benefit.)  
Or one could say that the precautionary principle will be applied to the 
risks that are most salient or of most concern to the public—and that the less 
salient or visible risks will be ignored.  And in fact, the precautionary principle 
often seems motivated by this form of selectivity—favoring the kind of risks that 
3
 Ralph Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, Risk Anal. 10, 147 (1990). 
R. Lutter, J. Morrall, and W. K. Viscusi, The Cost-per-Life Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing 
Regulations, Economic Inquiry 37, 4: 599-608.  (1999).
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cause tragedies that make headlines, while ignoring the kind that show up only as 
a result of statistical analysis.  
But why would that be sensible?  Isn’t a death or illness that occurs 
quietly, as a result of, say, a cumulative risk, just as important as a death or illness 
that occurs in a spectacular fashion that makes news?  Subtle causation is no less 
deadly.
These points help to identify another problem. The precautionary principle 
does not provide guidance on how much to regulate; it does not easily allow 
for weighing the variables that are at stake.
It leaves questions like these unanswered: How does one account for 
tradeoffs between present and future risks? How should we weigh expenditures 
on reducing particulate matter against the possible loss in resources available for 
food or health care? Does one value a life today more than one tomorrow? 
Without helping to answer such questions, the principle is not useful.
The Need To Balance Benefits and Costs 
We do not believe there is any principled way of making policy decisions 
without making the best possible effort to balance all the relevant costs of a policy 
against the benefits.  Looking only to costs, and ignoring benefits, is always a 
mistake.
Of course, the proper cost-benefit analysis can and should incorporate 
concerns about precaution. For example, a problem characterized by 
irreversibilities—such as the persistence of certain chemicals in the atmosphere 
that deplete the ozone layer—can be modeled using standard techniques in cost-
benefit analysis. Uncertainties about both benefits and costs can also be 
incorporated, perhaps by specifying a range of possible outcomes, perhaps by 
seeking to preserve specified options, or perhaps by identifying the worst-case 
scenario and showing a degree of risk aversion with respect to that scenario. 
In some cases, the balancing of benefits and costs will be easy.  In others, 
it will be hard to quantify benefits—as, for example, in the case of regulations 
designed to protect against terrorism, where it is hard to assign probabilities to 
various outcomes.  
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But even these hard cases should not excuse decision makers from at least 
attempting to make quantitative estimates of the costs of various options. 
The Fallacy of Believing We Can Live Risk-Free
The fact is, even in the case of terrorism and other hard cases, societies 
cannot afford to seek totally risk-free environments. If they try, they might well 
magnify the problems they face. 
For example, governments do not ban air travel, even though such bans 
would eliminate a possible source of terrorist attacks. An intuitive benefit-cost 
analysis suggests that the costs of banning air travel would greatly outweigh the 
benefits. 
For terrorism, climate change, and other vexing problems, hard choices 
must be made. The precautionary principle does not help individuals or nations to 
make such choices in a non-arbitrary way. 
Indeed, taken seriously, the precautionary principle can be paralyzing, 
providing no direction at all. Balancing costs against benefits ought not to be 
understood as a way of placing regulators into an arithmetic straightjacket. But it 
does offer the foundation of a principled approach for making difficult decisions. 
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Letters commenting on this piece or others may be submitted at 
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